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Rosa Brooks1 
Forthcoming, Yale Law & Policy Review, Summer 2014 
 
The Trickle-Down War 
 
“War made the state, and the state made war.”  
- Charles Tilly 2 
 
 The history of the European nation-state, wrote political sociologist 
Charles Tilly, is inextricably bound up with the history of warfare.  To 
oversimplify Tilly’s nuanced and complex arguments, the story goes 
something like this: As power-holders (originally bandits and local 
strongmen) sought to expand their power, they needed capital to pay for 
weapons, soldiers and supplies. The need for capital and new recruits drove 
the creation of taxation systems and census mechanisms, and the need for 
more effective systems of taxation and recruitment necessitated better roads, 
better communications and better record keeping. This in turn enabled the 
creation of larger and more technologically sophisticated armies.  
The complexity and expense of maintaining more professionalized 
standing armies made it increasingly difficult for non-state groups to compete 
with states, giving centralized states a war-making advantage and enabling 
them to increasingly monopolize the means of large-scale violence. But the 
need to recruit, train and sustain ever-larger and more sophisticated armies 
also put pressure on these states to provide basic services, improving 
nutrition, education, and so on. Ultimately, we arrive at the late 20th century 
European welfare state, with its particular trade-offs between the state and its 
subjects.3 
By now, Tilly’s claim that “war made the state, and the state made 
war” is so widely accepted that it has become almost a truism4 — so much so 
that we’re apt to forget that the process of war making and state 
transformation is ongoing, and not merely a matter for the history books. 
Today as in the past, the state makes war – and though there is nothing 
deterministic or teleological about it, the manner in which the state makes war 
drives further changes both in the shape of the state itself and in its 
relationship with individuals. 
“The state makes war” in several different senses. Most obviously, it 
is the state that wages war: the state chooses which wars to fight, and how to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Professor	  of	  Law,	  Georgetown	  University	  Law	  Center,	  and	  Senior	  Fellow,	  New	  America	  Foundation.	   Zach	   Klein,	   Georgetown	   Law	   ’15,	   provided	   first	   rate	   research	   assistance	  and	   many	   thoughtful	   comments.	   	   My	   colleague	   David	   Cole	   saved	   me	   from	   making	  several	  errors.	  More	  generally,	  this	  article	  also	  owes	  a	  great	  deal	  to	  conversations	  with	  Steve	  Vladeck,	  Martin	  Flaherty	  and	  Mary	  Dudziak.	  	  
2 Charles Tilly, Reflections on the History of European State Making, in THE FORMATION OF 
NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE, 42 (Charles Tilly ed.), 1975. 
3 Id.; See also CHARLES TILLY, COERCION, CAPITAL, AND EUROPEAN STATES, AD 900-1992 
(1st ed. 1990); Charles Tilly, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, in 
BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN 169 (Peter Evans et al. eds., 1985). 
4 See, e.g., JOHN A. HALL & G. JOHN IKENBERRY, THE STATE 40-41 (1989); ANTHONY 
GIDDENS, THE NATION STATE AND VIOLENCE 112 (1985); JAN GLETE, WAR AND THE STATE IN 
EARLY MODERN EUROPE 216 (2002); Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, The Origins of 
State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics, AM. ECON. REV., Sept. 2009, at 
1218. 
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fight them. In 2001, for instance, the United States decided to go to war in 
Afghanistan, first relying largely on air power in conjunction with small 
numbers of Army Special Forces troops and CIA paramilitary personnel, then 
expanding the military effort until, by 2010, the US force in Afghanistan 
consisted of roughly 100,000 troops.5 Similarly, in 2003 the US chose to 
invade Iraq, launching an eight-year war; by 2007, US troop levels in Iraq 
peaked at nearly 170,000.6 These “traditional” forms of state war-making 
have institutional and budgetary implications and opportunity costs, and 
though their long-term impact remains unknowable, they appear to fit into 
Tilly’s paradigm in relatively straightforward ways.7  
But the state “makes” war in other senses as well. From an 
institutional perspective, it is the state that decides which tasks to assign to 
civilian entities and which tasks to assign to the military (which we are apt to 
define, more or less tautologically, as that specialized state institution 
designated as having responsibility for the activity we call warfare).8  From a 
legal perspective, it is the state that chooses which activities will be 
categorized as “war” and war-related, thus determining the legal framework 
within which both individual rights and subsequent state uses of coercion and 
lethal force are evaluated.  
The United States’ response to 9/11 is a case in point. The 9/11 
attacks might have been viewed as egregious acts of criminality, for instance, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  Paul Waldman, The 13-Year War, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 18, 2013), 
http://prospect.org/article/13-year-war. 
6  Chart: U.S. Troop Levels in Iraq, CNN (Oct. 11, 2011), 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/21/world/meast/chart-us-troops-iraq/index.html. Overall, some 
2.5 million US military personnel had deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan by 2013. Chris 
Adams, Millions Went to War in Iraq, Afghanistan, Leaving Many with Lifelong Scars, 
MCCLATCHY DC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2013), 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/03/14/185880/millions-went-to-war-in-iraq-
afghanistan.html. 
7 One might argue, for instance, that the sheer cost of these two wars contributed to a spike in 
US debt  increasing US vulnerability to financial crisis and US reliance on foreign creditors 
such as China with consequent constraints on US foreign policy and domestic spending 
options. (See, e.g., Laura Bilmes, The Financial Legacy of Iraq and Afghanistan: How 
Wartime Spending Decisions Will Constrain Future National Security Budgets (Harvard 
University, Kennedy School of Government, Faculty Working Paper Series, March 2013, 
available at 
https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=8956; Max 
Fisher, “This surprising chart shows which countries own the most U.S. debt,” The 
Washington Post, October 10, 2013, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/10/10/this-surprising-chart-
shows-which-countries-own-the-most-u-s-debt/ ). The military, under strain due to frequent 
combat deployments, pushed for and received substantial increases in compensation and 
benefits for service members and their dependents. Meanwhile, other federal employees saw 
stagnating salaries and cuts in benefits, potentially reshaping the nature of federal 
employment and shifting the civil-military balance (See Congressional Budget Office, 
Analysis of Federal Civilian and 
Military Compensation, January 20, 2011, available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/120xx/doc12042/01-20-
compensation.pdf). At the same time, the greatly increased US reliance on private military 
contractors in these two wars helped fuel a vast expansion of private military and security 
companies, blurring the already blurry boundaries between public and private. (See, e.g., 
Shantanu Chakrabarti, Growth and Implications of Private Military Corporations, 2 J. 
DEFENCE STUDIES 109 (2008); see also Laura Dickinson, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE: 
PROTECTING PUBLIC VALUES IN AN ERA OF PRIVATIZED FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2011)).  8	  One	  might	  equally	  note	  that	  the	  state	  “makes”	  the	  military.	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or as an armed attack of sufficient gravity to trigger an international law right 
to use force in self-defense, without triggering an armed conflict.9 The US 
opted instead to treat the 9/11 attacks and the US response as an “armed 
conflict.”10  
This had legal consequences: once the US categorized the post-9/11 
relationship between the US and Al Qaeda—and, later, between the US and 
Al Qaeda’s “associates”—as “war,” a large swathe of state and non-state 
activities were brought within the ambit of the international law of armed 
conflict, with its far more permissive rules for the state use of lethal force, and 
its far weaker protections for individual rights. The existence of a “war” on 
terrorism also had enormous consequences for domestic law. Historically, 
lawmakers have offered the executive branch far greater powers and judges 
have afforded it far greater deference during wartime than during peacetime, 
and the post-9/11 war on terrorism continued that trend.11 
Since 9/11, the US has continued to “make” war by placing more and 
more activities into the “war” category. Consider cyber security. As with 
terrorism, the US had a choice: it might have decided that cyber security 
should be the sole province of the private sector or civilian agencies and that 
cyber-attacks should be treated only as torts or crimes; instead, it opted to 
create a military Cyber Command and recruit “cyber warriors,” in addition to 
giving some cyber security responsibilities to civilian agencies,12 and it chose 
to treat cyber-attacks as potentially constituting acts of war, subject to the 
laws of war.13 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of 
International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 993 (2001), available at 
http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/12/5/1558.pdf;  Matthew Jaffe & Jake Tapper, Senate Republicans 
Block James Cole, Key Obama Nominee at Justice Dept., ABC NEWS  (May 9, 2011), 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/05/senate-republicans-block-james-cole-key-
obama-nominee-at-justice-dept/; Alain Pellet, No, This is not War! The Attack on the World 
Trade Center: Legal Responses, EUR. J. INT’L L. DISCUSSION FORUM (Oct. 3, 2001),  
https://www.unodc.org/tldb/bibliography/Biblio_Internat_Law_Pellet_2001.doc. 
10 See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the Sept. 11th, 2001 
Terrorist Attacks (Sept. 11, 2001) (transcript available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html); President George W. 
Bush, News Conference on Efforts to Curb Terrorism (Sept. 13, 2001) (transcript available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/transcripts/bushtext2_091301.html); William 
H. Taft IV, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 
319, 320 (2003). As I have argued elsewhere, there was nothing inevitable or legally 
“necessary” about the US decision to treat its post 9/11 relationship with Al Qaeda as an 
armed conflict for legal purposes: the Bush administration could have opted to view the 
conflict through a different lens, but preferred not to, with far-reaching consequences. See 
generally, Rosa Brooks, Duck-Rabbits and Drones: Legal Indeterminacy in the War on 
Terror, STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2014), on file with author. 
11 See generally Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, 
and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675 (2004).  
12 Cheryl Pellerin, Cybercom Builds Teams for Offense, Defense in Cyberspace, U.S. DEP’T 
OF DEF.: AM. FORCES PRESS SERV. (Mar. 12, 2013), 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119506. 13	  I recognize that this language anthropomorphizes the state. In reality, of course, “states” 
decide nothing; the people who govern states make decisions, influenced by a wide range of 
factors.	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Though it takes us further from Tilly’s original paradigm,14 this kind 
of state war-making can transform the state as much as the more traditional 
forms of state war-making.15 In the US, for instance, the perceived need to 
monitor and act upon a far-flung global network of loosely-affiliated non-state 
actors with which we are “at war” has driven state investment in new 
technologies designed to enable global surveillance and the cross-border use 
of lethal force. While it’s too soon to say how this story will evolve, the 
increased use of these new capabilities is beginning to change the United 
States’ relationship with other states and to further erode traditional 
conceptions of sovereignty.  
New forms of state war-making also have significant implications for 
the relationship between individuals and the state. Some of these implications 
are relatively obvious: after 9/11, human rights advocates and civil 
libertarians were quick to point out the ways in which laws and policies 
purportedly necessary to the “war on terror” increased state power at the 
expense of transparency, accountability and individual rights. The indefinite 
detention of alleged terrorists as “enemy combatants” seemed at odds with 
due process norms, for instance, while the use of “enhanced” interrogation 
methods against terror suspects at times amounted to torture. More recently, 
media and advocacy attention has focused on National Security Agency 
monitoring of telephone and Internet communications and on drone strikes 
and other cross-border targeted killings of terror suspects in Pakistan, Yemen 
and Somalia. 
Most of these post-9/11 state activities have been authorized by 
Congress and/or have been largely upheld -- or at least tolerated-- by US 
courts.16  After 9/11, the USA PATRIOT Act and similar legislation greatly 
enhanced the state’s domestic search and seizure powers in national security-
related cases, for instance.17 Meanwhile, the Justice Department’s invocation 
of the state secrets doctrine made it difficult for litigants to challenge state 
actions undertaken in the name of national security, and courts have relied on 
other judicially-created doctrines to avoid ruling on the merits in most other 
cases challenging government activities arising out of the war on terror. 
Indeed, as Stephen Vladeck notes, “not a single damages judgment has been 
awarded in any of the dozens of lawsuits arising out of post-September 11 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Tilly’s paradigm was, in any case, historical in nature, developed to explicate the rise of the 
European nation-state rather than to suggest an eternal and unvarying relationship between 
war-making and state expansion. 15 	  See generally Philip Bobbit, TERROR AND CONSENT (2008), noting the numerous 
implications of the shift from wars between nation-states to war between states and powerful 
non-state actors.	  
16 The Supreme Court did impose some limits on early Bush Administration detention-related 
policies and efforts to remove detainees from the jurisdiction of US courts. See, e.g., Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004);  
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); 
Boumediene v Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). Similarly, Congress sought to rein in the US use 
of interrogation techniques amounting to torture. For the most part, however, Congress and 
the courts have acquiesced in the executive branch’s post-9/11 policies; even with regard to 
claims of torture, federal courts have found numerous reasons to prevent lawsuits seeking 
damages for torture from going forward. See Developments in the Law—Access to Courts, 
122 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1159 (2009) (noting that none of the cases seeking damages for 
alleged US torture have survived summary judgment). 
17 See What is the USA PATRIOT Act?, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Dec. 10, 2010), 
https://www.aclu.org/national-security/surveillance-under-usa-patriot-act. 
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U.S. counterterrorism policies alleging violations of plaintiff’s individual 
rights.”18 
The apparent erosion of individual rights stemming directly from the 
expansion of what the US treats as “war” and war-related is a phenomenon 
that has been well and amply documented.19 My purpose in this essay is not to 
add to that already vast literature, but rather to draw attention to some of the 
still more subtle ways in which U.S. practices and legal doctrines developed 
after 9/11 for “war-making” purposes may be altering the balance of power 
between individuals and the state.  
Specifically, my goal in this short essay is to draw attention to the 
slow trickling down of war-related legal doctrines and practices into 
“ordinary” law and law-enforcement. This trickle-down effect is diffuse and 
difficult to discern—in many cases, its existence remains largely 
speculative.20 But this makes efforts to document it all the more important, 
lest the very diffuseness and invisibility of trickle-down effects blind us to the 
ongoing and profound transformation of relations between individuals and the 
state. 
 I am by no means the first commentator to note the potentially 
distorting effect of national security practices and doctrines on seemingly 
unrelated areas of law and law enforcement. In September 2002, the Lawyers’ 
Committee for Human Rights (now renamed Human Rights First) published a 
report called A Year of Loss: Reclaiming Civil Liberties Since September 11.21 
This report—and a follow-up report published a year later22 -- looked at the 
impact of post-9/11 law and policy on such areas as general government 
transparency, the right to privacy, the treatment of immigrants, refugees and 
minorities, and the criminal justice system.  
More recently, legal scholars have looked at the rising use of 
classified evidence in criminal cases; the increased invocation of the state 
secrets doctrine in ordinary tort and contract litigation; the spillover of 
national-security related changes to qualified immunity doctrines into other 
areas of law; the impact of post-9/11 changes on immigration law and policy 
and the importation of military and counterterrorism tactics into domestic 
policing, among other issues.  Relatively few commentators, however, have 
sought to address the spillover of war and counter-terrorism practices and 
legal doctrines into “ordinary” law and law-enforcement as a distinct cross-
cutting problem-- 23  and to my knowledge, no one has yet sought to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See Stephen I. Vladeck, The New National Security Canon, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1296 
(2012). 19	  See,	  for	  instance,	  David	  Cole	  and	  Jules	  Lobel,	  LESS	  SAFE,	  LESS	  FREE:	  WHY	  AMERICA	  IS	  LOSING	  THE	  WAR	   ON	   TERROR	   (2007);	   see	   also	   Susan	   G.	   Herman,	   TAKING	   LIBERTIES:	   THE	  WAR	   ON	  TERROR	  AND	  THE	  EROSION	  OF	  AMERICAN	  DEMOCRACY	  (2012).	  
20  Indeed, the existence of such “trickle-down” effects is inherently hard to prove:  
disentangling correlation and causation is particularly difficult, and the secrecy shrouding 
some government activities—and even government legal arguments—makes matters all the 
worse. 
21 LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A Year of Loss: Reexamining Civil Liberties since 
September 11 (Sept. 2002), available at https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-
content/uploads/pdf/loss_report.pdf. 
22 LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Imbalance of Powers: How Changes to U.S. Law & 
Policy Since 9/11 Erode Human Rights and Civil Liberties (Mar. 2003), available at 
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/powers.pdf. 
23 Stephen Vladeck is a notable exception. See Vladeck, supra note 17; see also Stephen I. 
Vladeck, Foreword: National Security's Distortion Effects, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 285 
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comprehensively assess the nature and extent of this spillover, looking across 
multiple areas of civil and criminal law and law enforcement.24 
This essay does not seek to offer such a comprehensive assessment. 
Instead, it seeks to develop a preliminary and partial terrain map of the trickle-
down war, highlighting several areas in which there appear to be clear 
indications of a trickle-down effect, and noting also a number of areas in 
which the existence of current or future trickle-down effects seem probable, 
but in which the evidence is inconclusive or the terrain simply remains 
unexplored.  
A major caveat is necessary here: it is extraordinarily difficult to 
“prove” trickle-down.25 Trickle-down effects are generally gradual and subtle, 
rather than sudden and dramatic, making them inherently difficult to identify 
and measure—and it is more difficult still to determine the causes, rather than 
merely the correlates, of such gradual and subtle changes. My goal here is 
therefore not to reach definitive conclusions, but rather to outline a broader 
research agenda, in hopes that others will take up the challenge of 
comprehensively assessing the extent of the trickle-down war. 
To that end, this essay focuses on several areas in which war’s 
trickle-down effects may exist: domestic policing, the use of the state secrets 
doctrine, the use of classified evidence in criminal cases, immigration policy, 
First Amendment jurisprudence, privacy and surveillance. I also identify a 
number of other areas for further exploration. 
 
A. Policing: 
 
The trickle-down effects of America’s post-9/11 wars are perhaps 
most outwardly visible in domestic policing. In general, American policing 
has become far more militarized over the last few decades.26 The trend 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2010); Stephen I. Vladeck, The New National Security Cannon, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1295 
(2012); Stephen Vladeck, Is “National Security Law” Inherently Paradoxical?, 1 AM. U. 
NAT’L SECURITY L. BRIEF 11 (2011).  
24 Although little has been done to comprehensively map the trickle-down effects of the war 
on terror, a great deal has been written on the broad dangers posed by the normalization of 
emergency powers. I see this essay as a small contribution to that important literature. See 
generally Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 
1408 (1989); Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the 
Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001 (2004); Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency 
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004); THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND 
ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005); David Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. 
Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal Order?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2005 (2006); John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of the Exception: A Typology of 
Emergency Powers, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 210 (2004); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional 
Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 GA.L. REV. 699, 718-19 (2006); Oren Gross, 
The Normless and Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmitt's Theory of Emergency Powers and 
the "Norm-Exception" Dichotomy, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1825 (2000); Oren Gross, Chaos and 
Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 
(2003). See also Mary Duziak, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
(2012) (arguing that “wartime” has never been as sharply delineated as we often assume, and 
that far from being exceptional, various forms of war-related actions have been the norm for 
the United States throughout the last century).	  25	  This	  problem	  is	  exacerbated	  by	  government	  secrecy.	  
26 Abigail R. Hall & Christopher J. Coyne, The Militarization of U.S. Domestic Policing, THE 
INDEP. REV., Spring 2013, at 485; See generally, RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: 
THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICA’S POLICE FORCES (2013). 
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towards increased militarization predates 9/11, but accelerated substantially 
after the attacks. Consider the use of police SWAT teams, with their 
paramilitary tactics and equipment. The first police SWAT teams were 
created after the 1965 Watts riots in Los Angeles;27 initially, they were used 
primarily for emergencies such as hostage situations and domestic terror 
threats. Over time, however, the number of SWAT teams expanded and 
SWAT teams were increasingly used in routine policing -- deployed to 
execute search and arrest warrants in drug-related cases, for instance. Radley 
Balko and Peter Kraska estimate that there were roughly 3000 SWAT raids 
nationwide in 1980; by 2006, the number of annual SWAT raids had jumped 
to 50,000, and Balko and Kraska believe that by 2012, there were as many as 
80,000 SWAT raids per year.28  
The increased use of SWAT teams in ordinary policing has been 
paralleled by a similar post-9/11 rise in police efforts to adopt other tactics 
developed by foreign militaries and intelligence services for counterterrorism 
purposes,29 the proliferation of police academy programs modeled on military 
basic training,30 the increased use of military-style battle dress uniforms for 
police on the streets,31 and the growing use by police departments of weapons 
and other equipment developed for military purposes – from Humvees to 
surveillance drones. 32 Many of these weapons and equipment literally come 
direct from foreign war zones, through a Defense Department program that 
donates unneeded military equipment to police forces;33 Homeland Security 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 BALKO, supra note 23, at 53. 
28 See generally, id.; Tim Gurrister, Why more SWAT-style raids? A ‘militarized’ world, 
Standard-Examiner Aug. 10, 2013,  
http://www.standard.net/stories/2013/03/23/why-more-swat-style-raids-militarized-world; 
Sarah Stillman, SWAT-Team Nation, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 8, 2013, 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/08/swat-team-nation.html. 
29 Consider stop-and-frisk programs. See e.g., Patrice O’Shaughnessy, NYPD Gathering Intel, 
on Lookout for Terrorists Around the World, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, July 6, 2008, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/nypd-gathering-intel-lookout-terrorists-world-
article-1.351616; William Finnegan, The Terrorism Beat: How is the N.Y.P.D. Defending the 
City?, THE NEW YORKER, July 25, 2005, 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/07/25/050725fa_fact2; Anya Sostek, Taking 
Action: New York’s State of Mind, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POL’Y RES. (Oct. 2004), 
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/_govmag-out_of_the_twin_towers.htm; David 
Reeder, NYPD’s Elite E-Men: Ready to Counter Attack Terror, TACTICAL-LIFE (July 2009), 
http://www.tactical-life.com/magazines/tactical-weapons/nypds-elite-e-men/. 
30 Karl W. Bickel, Recruit Training: Are we Preparing Officers for a Community Oriented 
Department?, COMMUNITY POLICING DISPATCH, June 2013, 
http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/06-
2013/preparing_officers_for_a_community_oriented_department.asp. 
31 Karl W. Bickel, BDUs and Community Policing?, COMMUNITY POLICING DISPATCH (Nov. 
2012), http://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/11-2012/bdus-community-policing.asp. 
32 John Hanrahan, Local Police Forces are Now Little Armies. Why?, NIEMAN WATCHDOG 
(Oct. 6, 2011), 
http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=ask_this.view&askthisid=529; 
Defense Department Gives Local Police Equipment Designed for a War Zone, 
FOXNEWS.COM, (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/11/27/defense-
department-gives-local-police-equipment-designed-for-warzone/; Michael Shank & Elizabeth 
Beavers, The Militarization of U.S. Police Forces, REUTERS (Oct. 22, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/22/us-opinion-shank-idUSBRE99L12420131022. 
33 Michael Shank & Elizabeth Beavers, America’s Police are Looking More and More Like 
the Military, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 7, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/07/militarization-local-police-america. 
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counterterrorism grants have also fueled the police acquisition of tools more 
popularly associated with war.34  
Increasingly, war and policing have begun to converge both in terms 
of tactics and in terms of outward appearance. As John Parry has noted, 
“[W]ar has changed in its functions, to become more like policing, [and] 
policing too has changed, to become more like war.” 35  On the covert 
battlefields of the war on terror, outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. war-
making often superficially resembles policing in that it involves individuals 
and small teams rather than the large-scale armies associated with 19th  and 
20th century warfare, and its victories and defeats are defined in terms of the 
activities of individuals and organizations, rather than in terms of terrain held 
or surrendered. Meanwhile, as U.S. police departments increasingly use 
military tactics, weapons, equipment and even apparel, U.S. domestic policing 
has come to look more and more like war.  
 
B.  The State Secrets Privilege in Civil Cases 
 
The state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary rule 
permitting the government to block the release of information in civil 
litigation if the information would reveal secrets damaging to U.S. national 
security interests. The privilege can be invoked by the government even in 
litigation between private parties, and while courts have the power to make an 
independent evaluation of whether to accept government claims of state 
secrets, courts have generally deferred to executive branch requests.36 
Numerous commentators have decried the U.S. government’s 
frequent invocation of the state secrets privilege to prevent direct challenges 
to post-9/11 U.S. government policies from moving forward in the courts.37 
Laura Donohue has gone further, however, examining the ways in which the 
state secrets doctrine has increasingly been used by private litigants in areas 
far-removed from war and national security.38 Donohue examined docket 
records from the past thirty years and records from the more than 1300 case 
holdings since 1790 that refer to state secrets, supplementing this with an 
examination of “citations in pleadings, motions, briefs, memorandum 
opinions, judicial decisions, Headnote strings, legislative searches, and 
secondary source materials.”39 She found that while the state secrets doctrine 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Andrew Becker & G.W. Schulz, Local Cops Ready for War With Homeland Security-
Funded Military Weapons, THE DAILY BEAST (Dec. 21, 2011), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/12/20/local-cops-ready-for-war-with-homeland-
security-funded-military-weapons.html. 35	  John T. Parry, Terrorism and the New Criminal Process, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
765, 768 (2007)	  
36 See generally TODD GARVEY & EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41741, THE 
STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE: PREVENTING THE DISCLOSURE OF SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY 
INFORMATION DURING CIVIL LITIGATION (2011). 
37See, e.g., Erin E. Bohannon, Breaking the Silence: A Challenge to Executive Use of the 
State Secrets Privilege to Dismiss Claims of CIA Torture in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, 
Inc., 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 621 (2010); D.A. Jeremy Telman, Intolerable Abuses: Rendition 
for Torture and the State Secrets Privilege, 63 ALA. L. REV. 429 (2012); Geoffrey R. Stone, 
Secrecy and Self-Governance, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81 (2012); 100 Days: End the Abuse of 
the State Secrets Privilege, CENTER FOR CONST. RIGHTS, https://ccrjustice.org/learn-
more/faqs/100-days%3A-end-abuse-state-secrets-privilege (last visited Apr. 10, 2014). 
38 Laura Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77 (2010). 
39 Id. at 85. 
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is generally regarded as an evidentiary rule within the broader executive 
privilege doctrine, it has recently come to be used in a far wider range of 
ways.40  
The expansive war on terror has led to increased interpenetration of 
the government and the private sectors; the government has relied on private 
companies to provide a range of support services, and the government’s desire 
to access information such as private internet records as led to complex and 
generally secret new relationships between the military, the intelligence 
community and private companies. As a result, more and more private actors 
are in possession of government “secrets,” increasing the number of cases 
with no surface connection to national security in which private actors might 
nonetheless have to disclose classified information in the course of routine 
litigation. 41  Thus, Donohue found that the state secrets privilege has 
increasingly been invoked by private litigants in cases relating to “breach of 
contract, patent disputes, trade secrets, fraud, and employment termination . . . 
. Wrongful death, personal injury, and negligence . . . .”42  
Donohue also noted the rise of a form of “graymail,” in which 
corporations that possess sensitive information as a result of government 
contracts seek to pressure the government to intervene in private litigation by 
suggesting that absent government invocation of the state secrets doctrine, 
they may be “forced” to reveal state secrets in order to defend themselves.43 
Such subtle threats then create incentives for government intervention in 
litigation.44 Even when the government declines to intervene or when courts 
ultimately reject state secrets claims, the use of the state secrets doctrine as a 
litigation tool can delay cases or force their removal to federal courts, severely 
disadvantaging undercapitalized plaintiffs. 
In recent years, Donohue notes, the state secrets doctrine has evolved 
into a “powerful litigation tool, wielded by both private and public actors. It 
has been used to undermine contractual obligations and to pervert tort law, 
creating a form of private indemnity for government contractors in a broad 
range of areas. Patent law, contracts, trade secrets, employment law, 
environmental law, and other substantive legal areas have similarly been 
affected, even as the executive branch has gained significant and 
unanticipated advantages over opponents in the course of litigation.”45  
 
C.   Classified Information in Criminal Cases: 
 
The state secrets doctrine is not the only way in which the protection 
of secret information can have a distorting effect on “ordinary” law. In the 
context of criminal prosecutions, parallel dangers are raised by the Classified 
Information Procedures Act (CIPA). Under Section 4 of CIPA, the 
government can make an in camera, ex parte submission to the court to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Id. at 90-91. 
41 Thus, an employment discrimination case against a private contractor might require 
disclosure of the existence and nature of a classified program operated in support of the 
government, for instance. See generally McQueen, supra note 37.  
42 Id. at 87-88; see also Anjetta McQueen, Security Blanket: The State Secrets Privilege 
Threat to Public Employment Rights, 22 LAB. LAW. 329, 335 (2007). 
43 See Donohue, supra note 34 at 88. 
44 This is even the case when the “graymailing” corporations are acting in bad faith. 
45 Id. at 91.	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request authorization “to delete specified items of classified information from 
documents to be made available to the defendant through discovery…, to 
substitute a summary of the information for such classified documents, or to 
substitute a statement admitting the relevant facts that classified information 
would tend to prove.”46 Under Section 6 of CIPA, the defendant can be 
excluded from a hearing during which the court “make[s] all determinations 
concerning the use, relevance, or admissibility of classified information that 
would otherwise be made during the trial...."47  
CIPA is not new, but in the post 9/11 context it is has a newly 
worrisome impact.  Joshua Dratel 48  and Ellen Yarochefsky 49  argue the 
government has recently been classifying (most critics would say “over-
classifying”) documents at an unprecedented pace,50 and, as noted above, an 
ever-growing number of private companies have become involved in the 
production and use of classified information.51 As the sheer quantity and range 
of classified information increases, they note, we can expect an increase in the 
number of ordinary criminal cases that touch upon classified national security 
information in a purely ancillary way, thus also increasing the number of 
cases in which CIPA can be invoked by the government.  
CIPA was originally intended to prevent criminal defendants who had 
prior access to classified information as a result of their jobs from using 
discovery procedures to “graymail” the government into dropping or reducing 
charges, by raising the threat that the discovery process would require the 
disclosure of sensitive information.52 But CIPA is also applicable in criminal 
prosecutions in which the defendant has no access to classified documents, 
but believes that classified documents exist that might be important in his or 
defense case. In such contexts, the in camera and ex parte hearings permitted 
under CIPA can be extremely damaging to defendants: redacted or 
summarized classified documents may lose context, texture and detail that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  See Title 18, U.S.C. App III § 4.	  47	  See Title 18, U.S.C. App III § 6(a). 	  
48 Joshua L. Dratel, Section 4 of the Classified Information Procedures Act: The Growing 
Threat to the Adversary Process, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 1041 (2007). 
49 Ellen Yaroshefsky, Secret Evidence is Slowly Eroding the Adversary System: CIPA and 
FISA in the Courts, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063 (2006). See also Anna Maria Martignetti, The 
Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) and Suspected Terrorists in Federal Civilian 
Courts: Subject to the Most Exacting Demands of Justice? (Spring 2010) (unpublished LLM 
thesis, Lund University) (available at 
http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=1670606&fileOId=16706
07) 
 
50 See, e.g, INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DODIG-2013-142, DOD EVALUATION OF 
OVER-CLASSIFICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION, (2013), available at 
http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2013-142.pdf; see also Nick Schwellenbach, 
Could Secrecy Caps Reduce Over Classification? CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T (Aug. 5, 
2013), available at www.foreffectivegov.org/blog/could-secrecy-caps-reduce-over-
classification. 
51 See Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, Top Secret America: A Hidden World, Growing 
Beyond Control, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 19, 2010), 
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-
beyond-control ( “Some 1,271 government organizations and 1,931 private companies work 
on programs related to counterterrorism, homeland security and intelligence in about 10,000 
locations across the United States…. An estimated 854,000 people, nearly 1.5 times as many 
people as live in Washington, D.C., hold top-secret security clearances.”). 
52 See Martinetti, supra note 51, at 7. 
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might be important to the defense, and judges may have little ability to 
evaluate whether classified information submitted ex parte would help the 
defendant and should be made discoverable.53  
 “The impact of secret evidence upon the adversary system has yet to 
be acknowledged,” argues Yaroshefsky, “in large measure because of the 
unstated belief that [CIPA is] confined to a narrow range of terrorism cases.”54 
But, she asserts, “secret evidence is seeping into the criminal justice system,” 
as a result of over-classification, the growing number of individuals and 
companies involved in classified activities and the tendency of prosecutors to 
“overcharge” ordinary crimes under anti-terrorism statutes.55 
As Yarochefsky also notes, the “internationalization of crime and law 
enforcement” also increases the likelihood that information relevant to a U.S. 
criminal case will draw upon classified sources or methods.56 As more and 
more crime crosses international borders, for instance—consider drug crime, 
financial crime, internet-related crime and trafficking and prostitution-related 
crime—U.S. domestic law enforcement officials increasingly seek the 
assistance of the intelligence community to gain information about foreign 
activities linked to US criminal investigations. Such information may stem 
from sensitive relationships with foreign intelligence services or assets, 
however, or from classified intelligence collection methods. As a result, many 
domestic criminal prosecutions are increasingly intertwined with classified 
programs. This, in turn, can lead to the increased government invocation of 
CIPA in criminal cases that are themselves unrelated to national security, with 
the ultimate effect of depriving defendants of access to vital information.57 
 
D.  Immigration Law and Policy 
 
 Since 9/11, U.S. immigration law and policy have become deeply 
bound up with counterterrorism efforts. The 9/11 attackers were all foreigners, 
and the apparent ease with which they entered the United States raised 
obvious questions about the adequacy of U.S. border-control methods and 
screening programs. After 9/11, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
was relocated into the newly created Department of Homeland Security and 
reorganized; most of its responsibilities shifted to DHS’s new Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement division (“ICE”). 58 The name change signaled a 
shift away from a “service” model to an “enforcement” model.  
There has been enormous post-9/11increase in funding for 
immigration programs with connections to homeland security;59 in particular, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 See Yaroshefsky, supra note 51, at 1070-72; see also Martinetti, supra note 51, at 59. 
54 Id. at 1080. 
55 Id. at 1080-1082. Yaroshefsky also notes “a growing concern that CIPA is being used as a 
back door means for the government to withhold information otherwise subject to discovery 
under Rule 16.” Id. at 1072. 
56 Id. at 1082. 
57 See id. at 1068. 
58  MICHELLE MITTELSTADT ET AL., MIGRATION POL’Y INST., THROUGH THE PRISM OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY: MAJOR IMMIGRATION POLICY AND PROGRAM CHANGES IN THE DECADE 
SINCE 9/11 10 (2011). 
59 Id. at 3 (CBP’s budget more than doubled since FY2002, and the staff increased 43%, 
including a 104.6% increase in Border Patrol personnel. The ICE budget also more than 
doubled and increased 39.7% in manpower). 
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as a 2011 Migration Policy Institute Report documents,60 the post 9/11 era has 
given rise to  “a new generation of interoperable databases and systems that 
sit at the crossroads of intelligence and law enforcement, reshaping 
immigration enforcement . . .  through increased information collection and 
sharing.”61  
The original purpose of this extensive data collection – including the 
collection of biometric data -- was driven by the desire to identify those with 
connections to AL Qaeda and prevent additional terrorist attacks. Numerous 
US government organizations gather information on resident aliens and 
foreigners seeking entry into the US at airports and land borders. At least in 
theory, the ability to cross-check such information with information gathered 
by intelligence and law-enforcement agencies can enable US officials to 
prevent potential terrorist plotters from gaining entry into the United States, 
and trace connections between foreign nationals already inside the United 
States and foreign terrorist organizations.  
But though only a tiny fraction of immigrants and foreign visitors 
have any nexus to terrorism, such extensive data-collection and information-
sharing has become the norm for all immigrant groups and most foreign 
travelers to the United States. This has costs: it has led to substantial post-9/11 
growth in the number of annual immigrant detentions and deportations, for 
instance. Information-sharing between law enforcement and immigration 
officials has increased the number of immigrants identified as deportable due 
to involvement in criminal activities (though the crimes involved are often 
exceedingly minor).62 Information-sharing between intelligence agencies and 
ICE has also led to increased scrutiny of immigrants from particular countries, 
ethnic groups and religious backgrounds, leading to unequal enforcement of 
immigration laws.63  
It is impossible to say for sure whether these changes have reduced 
the risk of terrorism. What does seem clear, however, is that they have made 
individual immigrants and foreign nationals far more vulnerable to various 
forms of surveillance, detention and removal. 
 
E.  The First Amendment 
In June 2010, the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge 
to 18 U.S.C. § 2339B3 (2006), which criminalizes the provision of material 
support or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations.64 The statute 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 2. US-VISIT collects fingerprints and photographs for all noncitizens entering the 
country and stores them in the IDENT database, which is interoperable with the FBI’s 
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System. The Student and Exchange Visitor 
Information System (SEVIS), authorized by the 1996 reforms, permits the tracking of 
international students. Other databases abound. Id. at 5. 
62 See Paige Scheckla, Personal Security for Citizens and Non-Citizens in Post-9/11 US 
Immigration Policy, U.  CHI. INT’L HUM. RTS CLINIC (Nov. 19, 2013), 
https://ihrclinic.uchicago.edu/blog/personal-security-citizens-and-non-citizens-post-911-us-
immigration-policy-paige-scheckla-1l; see also SAMANTHA HAUPTMAN, THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION: THE POST 9/11 MORAL PANIC (2013). 
63 Deepa Iyer & Jayesh M. Rathod, 9/11 and the Transformation of U.S. Immigration Law 
and Policy, 38 HUM. RTS. MAG. (Winter 2011), 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol3
8_2011/human_rights_winter2011/9-
11_transformation_of_us_immigration_law_policy.html.  
64 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
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defined material support broadly, to include “any property, tangible or 
intangible, or service… training, expert advice or assistance… 
communications equipment [or] facilities.” It was challenged by the 
Humanitarian Law Project, which argued that the statute’s language was 
impermissibly vague, and could be construed to criminalize its own efforts to 
marshal expert legal and policy arguments for the purpose of persuading the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (which the Secretary of State had designated as a 
“foreign terrorist organization”) to refrain from violence and pursue its 
political goals through peaceful means, thus effectively criminalizing mere 
speech.65  
The Court agreed that the statute might have the effect of 
criminalizing mere speech, and that strict scrutiny should therefore apply. 
Traditionally, strict scrutiny requires the government to show that restrictions 
on individual constitutional rights are necessary and “narrowly tailored” to 
further a compelling government interest.66 In Holder, the Court found that the 
prevention of terrorism constitutes a compelling government interest—but 
rendered the requirement that the restriction on First Amendment rights be 
necessary and narrowly tailored almost meaningless by deferring to 
government assertions that the type of speech contemplated by the 
Humanitarian Law Project would interfere with government terrorism 
prevention efforts.67 
As David Cole has noted, the case was not decided on national 
security grounds as such, but as a question of general constitutional law.68 
This raises troubling questions about “the decision’s potential consequences 
for First Amendment doctrine more generally.” Cole comments, “For the first 
time in its history, the Court upheld the criminalization of speech advocating 
only nonviolent, lawful ends on the ground that such speech might 
unintentionally assist a third party in criminal wrongdoing…The Court treated 
a viewpoint-based motive for suppressing speech not as grounds for 
invalidation, but as a justification for the law. And the Court reduced the right 
of association to an empty formalism, allowing the government to prohibit, 
under the rubric of “material support,” virtually any concrete manifestation of 
association—such as paying dues, donating funds, volunteering one’s time or 
services, or working together toward common ends, no matter how lawful.”69  
Here, the existence of trickle-down is much more speculative. 
Though the Court’s decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project was 
clearly influenced by the counter-terrorism context of the statute, the Court’s 
holding could have significant consequences far beyond the counterterrorism 
context.  In Humanitarian Law Project, “strict scrutiny” looked far more like 
rational basis review—a highly deferential standard of review. As Cole notes, 
this raises troubling questions about the future of First Amendment rights: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Id. at 2713. 
66 See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990); Boos v. 
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334 (1988) (plurality); see also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 
(1992) (plurality); Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 573 (1987); 
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985); United 
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).	  
67 David Cole, The First Amendment’s Borders: The Place of Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 148, 158 (2012). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 149. 
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“Could training in nonviolent mediation [for gang members] be prohibited on 
the ground that it might ‘legitimate’ the gang,” he asks,  “thereby making it 
more attractive to new members who might commit future crimes? Could 
peaceable environmental advocacy coordinated with Greenpeace be banned 
because the organization sometimes engages in illegal trespass or property 
damage as civil disobedience?”70 
It is of course too soon to determine the impact of Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project. Perhaps courts will find ways to limit its impact; 
in Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. U.S. Department of the 
Treasury,71 the 9th Circuit read Humanitarian Law Project narrowly.72 But 
there is already some evidence that the material support statute and similar 
provisions have had a chilling effect on civil society organizations. A 2007 
report published by the International NGO Training and Research Centre 
(INTRAC) notes, for instance, that “[i]n the absence of clear, sensible 
guidance and information from government about . . . what is legally required, 
confusion and fear are driving the response of the nonprofit sector in the 
campaign against terror . . . . ”73 For instance, “[i]n recent decades the best 
practice trend in aid has been for northern NGOs to move away from service 
provision and to partner with local NGOs who actually do the work. However, 
in the current climate the risk of partner selection is so great and demands 
from the government so onerous that many US agencies find that being a 
service provider is safer.”74 
 
F. Privacy and Surveillance 
 
The war on terror has also led the US government to dramatically 
step up its efforts to collect and analyze an extraordinarily wide range of 
information, from cell phone metadata and Internet communications to 
biometric data. Meanwhile, technological advances have enabled the more 
effective analysis of information gathered through various forms of 
surveillance. (Surveillance imagery can now be subjected to facial recognition 
analysis, for instance, enabling an unprecedented degree of tracking: given 
one photograph of an individual, facial recognition software can sift through 
countless other images—whether provided by government surveillance 
cameras or posted by acquaintances on social media sites—to find matches.)75  
In the national security context, recent technological leaps in 
surveillance and analysis capabilities have also enabled a recent shift towards 
identifying and targeting “enemy combatants” who have been identified as 
such purely by pattern analysis, with no specific information linking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Id. at 157	  
71 686 F.3d 965 (9th Cir., Feb. 27 , 2012). 72	  Ibid,	  995-­‐1001.The	  9th	  Circuit	  argued that while strict scrutiny might be satisfied in the 
specific factual context at issue in Humanitarian Law Project, it could not be satisfied with 
regard to government efforts to ban speech coordinated with a domestic affiliate of a foreign 
terrorist organization under circumstances rendering it unlikely that the speech at issue would 
interfere with the government’s compelling interest of preventing terrorism. 	  
73 Tim Morris, The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures on Civil Society, INT’L NGO 
TRAINING & RESEARCH CTR. 3 (2010), 
http://www.timmorris.info/cairo%20CTM%20presentation.pdf. 
74 Id. at 4. 
75 See generally Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional 
Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age., 97 MINN L. REV 407 (2012). 
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identifiable individuals to hostile activities. This has led to an increase in so-
called “signature strikes”: drone strikes against unidentified people presumed 
to be targetable enemies because of their communications patterns, travel 
patterns, and so on. 76  
Domestically, the existence of a trickle-down effect remains 
speculative, but fears of trickle-down seem well founded. The post 9/11 USA 
PATRIOT Act effectively eliminated the pre-9/11 “firewall” between foreign 
intelligence gathering and domestic law enforcement, permitting intelligence 
agencies to engage in the surveillance of US citizens believed to be agents of 
a foreign power, as long as the gathering of foreign intelligence is a 
“significant” purpose of the surveillance.77 The PATRIOT Act also permits 
federal law enforcement officials to access a wide range of sensitive 
information (including internet records, telephone metadata, library records 
and credit and banking information of US citizens) upon successful 
application to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Law enforcement 
officials need not show probable cause, however; they need only show that 
“there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are 
relevant to an authorized investigation… to obtain foreign intelligence 
information not concerning a United States person or to protect against 
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.” 78  (My 
emphasis).  
It’s easy to imagine information gained in this manner being 
“repurposed” by law enforcement officials. Even if such information cannot 
be used in criminal prosecutions, embarrassing information gleaned through 
data collection and surveillance might be used in other ways by law 
enforcement officials—to put pressure on potential witnesses or informants, 
for instance.79 Similarly, the sophisticated pattern-recognition technologies 
originally developed for military and intelligence purposes can also easily be 
used by domestic law enforcement officials in ways that do not require 
extensive “new” data collection or surveillance, but that nonetheless shift 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 See, e.g, David S. Cloud, “CIA drones have broader list of targets,” The Los Angeles 
Times, May 5, 2010, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/may/05/world/la-fg-drone-
targets-20100506; see also Cora Currier and Justin Elliott, “The Drone War Doctrine We Still 
Know Nothing About,” ProPublica, Feb. 26, 2013, available at 
http://www.propublica.org/article/drone-war-doctrine-we-know-nothing-about	  
77 USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §1804 et. 
seq.). Previously, foreign intelligence gathering had to be a “primary” purpose. See generally, 
Susan Landau, National Security on the Line, 4 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 409 (2006); 
Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264 
(2004).  78	  USA PATRIOT Act, §215, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861.  The court conducts 
an in camera review, and issues ex parte approval orders. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b); 
Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA), 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A); Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u(b), 1681v(a); National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 436(a)(3). The 
National Security Agency’s program to collect telephone metadata on US citizens was 
approved under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. See Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board, Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted under Section 215 of the USA 
PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, January 
23, 2014, http://www.pclob.gov/SiteAssets/Pages/default/PCLOB-Report-on-the-Telephone-
Records-Program.pdf.  
79 Timothy B. Lee, Here’s How Phone Metadata Can Reveal Your Affairs, Abortions, and 
Other Secrets, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
switch/wp/2013/08/27/heres-how-phone-metadata-can-reveal-your-affairs-abortions-and-
other-secrets. 
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away from individualized determinations in a manner that raises troubling 
constitutional questions.80 
Beyond this, widespread surveillance and government access to 
personal data can have obvious chilling effects on the exercise on 
constitutionally protected rights. Consider, for instance, the impact on 
journalists, who must rely heavily on information provided confidentially by 
sources.81 “Some of our longtime trusted sources have become nervous and 
anxious about talking to us, even on stories that aren’t about national 
security,” Associated Press President Gary Pruitt noted in a 2013 speech.82  
“And in some cases, government employees that we once checked in with 
regularly will no longer speak to us by phone, and some are reluctant to meet 
in person.”83  
Pruitt adds that “[t]his chilling effect is not just at AP, it’s happening 
at other news organizations as well. Journalists from other news organizations 
have personally told me it has intimidated sources from speaking to them. 
Now, the government may love this. I suspect they do. But beware the 
government that loves secrecy too much.”84 
 
 Conclusion:  
 
In this brief essay, I have focused above on policing, the state secrets 
privilege in civil litigation, classified information in criminal litigation, 
immigration, first amendment jurisprudence and surveillance issues for the 
simple reason that these are the areas in which I was able to find the largest 
amount of information suggesting a potential spillover of war into ordinary 
law and law enforcement. Many other areas call out for research in addition to 
these, however.  
For instance, one might wish to look more broadly at various forms 
of judicial deference to the executive, to see if the patterns of deference 
emerging from national security-related cases are correlated with an increase 
in deference in other kinds of cases. Stephen Vladeck has already done some 
valuable work in this and related areas, looking at the political question 
doctrine, the availability of Bivens remedies, federal common law defenses to 
state-law suits against government contractors and qualified immunity. 
Ultimately, he notes, as “‘national security’-based exceptions increasingly 
become the rule in contemporary civil litigation against government 
officers—whether with regard to new ‘special factors’ under Bivens, new 
bases for contractor preemption under Boyle, proliferation of the political 
question doctrine, or even more expansive reliance upon the qualified 
immunity defense—the line between the unique national security 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Imagine, for instance, the use of pattern recognition technologies to identify, investigate 
and potentially entrap users of prohibited drugs. See generally, Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video 
Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World 
that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1351–52 (2004).  
81 See Emily Bell et al., Comment to Review Group on Intelligence and Communications 
Technologies Regarding the Effects of Mass Surveillance on the Practice of Journalism (Oct. 
4, 2013), http://towcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Letter-Effect-of-mass-
surveillance-on-journalism.pdf. 
82  Mackenzie Weinger, AP Boss: Sources Won’t Talk Anymore, POLITICO, 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/ap-sources-93054.html, (last updated June 20, 2013). 
83 Id.  
84 Id. 
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justifications giving rise to these cases and ordinary civil litigation will 
increasingly blur.”85 
It would also be valuable to explore the enduring impact of 9/11 on 
principles of government transparency: after 9/11, many once-public 
government documents (such as those relating to public water management 
supply systems,86 blueprints of government buildings and so on) ceased to be 
public, due to fears that these documents might make it easier for terrorists to 
plan attacks. But the removal of such documents from the public domain also 
reduces government transparency vis a vis citizens.87 Has the post-9/11 trend 
towards limiting publicly available information continued? Has it spread?  
One might also look at whether the increased use of ex parte and in 
camera proceedings in cases touching upon classified information is 
correlated with a greater judicial willingness to permit ex parte proceedings in 
other contexts not involving classified information. On a different issue, one 
might seek to determine whether US government efforts to redefine 
“imminence” in the international self-defense context are correlated with 
similar efforts to reconceptualize imminence in domestic self-defense 
contexts. (The Bush Administration’s doctrine of preemptive self-defense—
more or less carried on by the Obama Administration via its changed 
understanding of imminence—parallels the logic of domestic “stand your 
ground” laws).  
I could go on, but in general, I share Vladeck’s suspicion that, “[f]or 
better or worse, one can find national security considerations influencing 
ordinary judicial decision making across almost the entire gamut of 
contemporary civil and criminal litigation.”88 To this, I would only add that 
national security considerations have likely also seeped into law enforcement 
practices,89 immigration policies, and a range of other non-judicial activities. 
As I noted at the beginning of this essay, trickle-down effects are 
inherently difficult to discern and measure,90 and it is also extraordinarily 
difficult to determine causation. Perhaps 9/11 merely accelerated pre-existing 
trends; perhaps it had no causal impact at all. Perhaps some or all of the trends 
hinted at above would have emerged with or without 9/11 and the war making 
that followed.91  But these difficulties do not make the project of seeking to 
identify trickle down effects less important. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Vladeck, The New National Security Canon, supra note 17, at 1330. 
86 R.I. Affiliate, The Legacy of the Indefinite “War on Terror” in Rhode Island: Civil 
Liberties in the Aftermath of 9/11, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 14 (2011), 
http://riaclu.org/images/uploads/WaronTerrorinRhodeIslandReport.pdf. 
87 LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A Year of Loss: Reexamining Civil Liberties since 
September 11 , supra note __, and  LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Imbalance of 
Powers: How Changes to U.S. Law & Policy Since 9/11 Erode Human Rights and Civil 
Liberties, supra note __ 
88 Vladeck, Foreword: National Security's Distortion Effects, supra note 21, at 288. 89	  Tellingly, for instance, the USA PATROT Act’s authorization of delayed-notice search 
warrants (permitting so-called “sneak and peak” searches) was motivated by counterterrorism 
concerns, but studies suggest that less than one percent of delayed notice warrant cases have 
actually involved terrorism. The rest have involved ordinary crimes; 75 percent of delayed 
notice warrants are used in drug cases. See Jonathan Witmer-Rich, The Rapid Rise of 'Sneak 
and Peak' Searches, and the Fourth Amendment 'Rule Requiring Notice' 41 PEPPERDINE LAW 
REVIEW___, (2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2226977 90	  This	  problem	  is	  exacerbated	  by	  government	  secrecy.	  
91 As Vladeck notes in The New National Security Canon, for instance, “ . . . the Rehnquist 
and Roberts courts have systematically made it more difficult for civil plaintiffs to obtain 
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This short essay only scratches the surface. Nonetheless, my hope is 
that it will inspire additional efforts to map the trickle-down effects of the war 
on terror in a more comprehensive manner, challenging as that task may be. 
So far, most efforts to examine the spillover of post-9/11 doctrines and 
practices into ordinary law and law enforcement have been piecemeal and ad 
hoc. But thirteen years after 9/11, we may now be able to look at the 
phenomena more comprehensively. Given the close historical 
interrelationship between war-making and state transformation, can we afford 
not to? 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
damages in cases arising out of governmental misconduct.” Vladeck, supra note 17, at 1297. 
See also Laura Donohue, The Limits of National Security, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573 (2011) 
(charting the timelines of national-security-discourse-driven laws and suggesting that 9/11 
likely just accelerated the expansion of state power vis a vis individuals); Jack M. Balkin, The 
Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2008) (arguing that 
increased government surveillance is driven by accelerating developments in information 
technology, and that the war on terror is not its sole or most important cause); John T. Parry, 
Terrorism and the New Criminal Process, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 834-835 (2007) 
(noting that while 9/11 “accelerated the development of a new criminal process,” the post-
9/11 changes also “reflect trends in ordinary criminal procedure. That is to say, the pressures 
that generate the processes associated with the war on terror apply more broadly, so that we 
are experiencing a general modification of the way in which our government investigates and 
imposes punishment on people…. [T]hese processes…. reflect a larger shift in our approach 
to governing, in which legally authorized discretion is increasingly valued as a way to 
respond to a steady stream of perceived crises”). See also Marcus D. Dubber, Preventive 
Justice and the Quest for Principle, in Andrew Ashworth, Lucia Zedner and Patrick Tomlin, 
ed., PREVENTION AND THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2013), arguing that recent 
scholarship focusing on the shift towards preventing policing fails to understand that the 
shift’s historical antecedents.  
 
